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Abstract 
This paper examines the structure of wages for adult male workers within a dual labour 
market framework using micro survey data for three years spanning almost two decades. 
Augmented Mincerian wage equations are estimated for different types of workers – those 
with regular wage or salaried jobs and those with casual or contractual jobs - using a set of 
human capital measures and a variety of worker, industry and state characteristics after 
correcting for potential selection bias. This paper finds that the returns to education and 
experience are significantly different for these two types of workers consistent with the notion 
of segmented labour markets - while casual workers face at best flat returns the returns for 
regular  workers  are  positive  and  rising  in  education  level.  There  is  some  evidence  of 
significant changes in the returns to education for regular workers over time. The widening of 
the  gap  between  graduate  and  primary  education  and  the  rise  in  wage  inequality  could 
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1. Introduction 
 
The late 1980s and 1990s were a period of rapid industrial deregulation and trade 
liberalisation in India. This paper exploits three national employment surveys 1983, 
1993-94  and  1999-2000  to  explore  the  structure  of  wages  of  adult  male  workers 
before and after this economic liberalisation. In particular, this paper focuses on the 
returns to education and experience for different types of workers – those with regular 
wage or salaried jobs and those with casual or contractual jobs - in the Indian labour 
market. The first survey can be interpreted as providing insights into the structure of 
Indian labour markets prior to liberalisation while the latter two provide the basis for 
delineating a portrait of these structures after the radical trade liberalisation process.  
 
The main motivation for looking at these two types of workers separately rather than 
conflating them into one category, as in previous work on the Indian labour market, is 
based on the notion of a dual labour market. This model argues that labour markets in 
developing countries are often segmented into primary and secondary labour markets 
with poor and marginal workers “confined to a labour market distinct from that in 
which middle class workers are employed” (Heckman and Hotz, 1986, pp. 508). This 
is usually interpreted as a division between the organised or formal and unorganised 
or  informal  sector.  Unni  (2001,  pp.  2361)  argues  that  the  notion  of  an  “informal 
economy” that characterises workers “depending on the degree of informality of their 
work status” is more relevant for examining wage structures. Similarly, Tendulkar 
(2003) and Das (2003) argue that in the Indian context this organised-unorganised 
dichotomy is better represented using a typology reflecting the employment status of 
the individual. This is the approach followed in this paper - workers with casual wage 
employment and workers with regular wage employment are assumed to compete in 
distinct labour markets.  
 
There have been several studies on the determinants of wages in India (see Kingdon 
(1998) for a recent review). All these studies as well as Kingdon & Unni (2001) use a 
sample of workers within a city or urban areas of a state at a point in time. In contrast 
Duraisamy (2002) estimates returns to education using national data from 1983 and 
1993-94. These studies either do not address the issue of potential selection bias or do 
so as a dichotomous realisation between wage employment and all other categories.   3
All these studies estimate a single wage regression model for all workers – regular 
and casual – ignoring the possibility of different wage-setting mechanisms for each 
type.  This  paper  extends  previous  work  on  the  structure  of  wages  in  India  by 
analysing  national  data  at  three  points  in  time  spanning  almost  two  decades  and 
addresses  the  issue  of  potential  selection  bias  in  wages  generated  under  different 
mechanisms within a dual labour market framework.
2  
  
This paper is structured as follows. The next section justifies the use of a dual labour 
market  framework  and  examines  the  wage  inequality  between  the  two  types  of 
workers. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy. Following the standard labour 
economics literature wage regression models are estimated as augmented Mincerian 
earnings  equations  controlling  for  human  capital  and  other  controls.  The  issue  of 
potential selectivity bias is addressed using the generalised framework developed by 
Lee (1983). Section 4 presents the empirical results for the wage regression models 
for regular and casual workers. The returns to education both types of workers and the 
changes in these returns between 1983 and 1999 are examined in the next section. 
Section 6 offers some conclusions and policy implications. 
 
2. The informal economy: regular-casual worker dichotomy  
 
The  dual  labour  market  model  supposes  the  existence  of  two  distinct  sectors  of 
economic activity usually classified as the organised and unorganised sectors. The 
organised sector offers more stable jobs with higher pay, better working conditions 
and  promotional  opportunities  whereas  the  unorganised  sector  is  associated  with 
unstable  jobs  and  low  or  even  flat  returns  to  schooling,  poor  pay,  bad  working 
conditions  and  few  opportunities  for  advancement    (Dickens  and  Lang,  1985; 
Taubman and Wachter, 1986). Thus the dual labour market approach argues that there 
are two distinct types of jobs with separate wage equations and independent normally 
distributed unobservables.   
 
                                                 
2  The  dual  labour  market  assumption  of  entry  barriers  to  the  primary  sector  labour  market  that 
effectively rations these jobs is not examined in this study. As demonstrated by Heckman and Hotz 
(1986), this is not an easy issue to address empirically.   4
Tendulkar  (2003)  and  Das  (2003)  argue  that  in  the  Indian  context  the  organised-
unorganised dichotomy generally used to analyse labour market outcomes is better 
represented using a typology reflecting the employment status of the individual. There 
are two reasons why this is a desirable strategy. First, the NSS surveys do not report 
whether the individual is employed in the organised or unorganised sector; they do 
however report whether the worker has a regular or casual job or is self-employed, 
unemployed or not participating in the labour market. The 1999 survey reported data 
on the type of enterprise that can be used to classify it as belonging to the organised or 
unorganised sector. This classification reveals that about 57% of regular workers were 
employed  in  enterprises  that  were  either  public,  semi-public  or  otherwise  in  the 
registered or organised sector but only 10% of casual workers were so employed.   
 
Second, in the dual labour market literature workers in the unorganised sector are 
engaged in economic activities with low productivity resulting in low incomes, less 
stable  employment  contracts  (this  includes  the  self  employed)  and  fewer  social 
security benefits. There is an increasing awareness that the type of work contract is a 
better indicator of the informality of an individual's employment rather than whether 
or  not  the  workplace  is  in  the  organised  sector.  For  instance,  a  worker  with  a 
temporary  contract  with  no provisions for social security should be  considered  as 
belonging to the unorganised sector even though he works in a large factory. In the 
Indian  context  this  translates  directly  into  the  regular  worker  -  casual  worker 
dichotomy. Regular wage employment is often considered to be the most preferred 
category of work (Das, 2003). Tendulkar (2003) refers to "workers having regular, 
contractual hired employment" as the "labour aristocracy because of the privileged 
service conditions this segment enjoys including high wages" (pp.2). Though these 
high wages reflect at least in part the returns to the higher skill endowments of these 
workers, redundancy (especially in the public sector) suggests the presence of rents. 
Regular  workers  are  also  covered  by  labour  market  regulations  that  confer  some 
measure of employment security and social security benefits. Casual workers can be 
considered a subset of the informal labour market - they are generally engaged in 
economic activity with low wages, unstable employment contracts and little or no 
social security benefits. These workers are also much more likely to be poor than an 
individual with regular wage employment thereby fitting the description of poor and 
marginal workers competing in a distinct labour market (Heckman and Hotz, 1986).    5
 
Under the assumption that there are indeed two distinct types of jobs with separate 
wage equations and independent normally distributed unobservables the process of 
wage  determination  for  each  of  these  types  of  jobs  can  be  separately  analysed. 
Heckman and Hotz (1986) give a comprehensive critique of the inadequacy of tests 
for labour market segmentation and there is no attempt to formally test segmentation 
between the two types of wage employment. The focus of this paper is on the process 
of wage determination for each of these workers and the wage gap between them. The 
analysis uses data drawn from the large-scale employment surveys were undertaken - 
January-December 1983, July 1993–June 1994 and July 1999–June 2000 (referred to 
as 1983, 1993 and 1999 in this paper).
3 The data appendix describes the data used in 
this paper. The empirical analysis reported in this paper is restricted to prime-aged 
adult males. Regular wage employment is taken as analogous to the ‘primary labour 
market’ and casual wage employment to the ‘secondary labour market’ in the dual 
labour market literature. 
 
2.1. Profile of regular and casual workers  
 
The bulk of the adult male labour force in India is self-employed while only a small 
proportion  is  unemployed  (see  Table  1).  During  this  period  the  share  of  regular 
workers fell in urban areas while that of casual workers increased in both rural and 
urban areas. Some have argued that these trends reflect an increase in casualisation 
and contracting as employers attempt to increase flexibility post-liberalisation despite 
the fact that the labour market had not been formally deregulated (Deshpande and 
Deshpande, 1998; Kundu, 1997). Without further analysis, however, it is not possible 
to attribute these changes to the effects of liberalisation during the 1990s.  
 
Table 1: Distribution of adult male workers by employment status (%) 


















1983  10.38  24.59  61.16  3.86  42.26  12.14  39.00  6.60 
1993  10.58  24.26  62.20  2.96  40.93  12.90  41.04  5.13 
                                                 
3 The employment survey for 1987-88 could not be used as over 76% of observations on rural wages 
for persons participating in wage employment are missing.   6
1999  10.80  25.92  59.65  3.64  39.18  13.93  41.24  5.65 
Notes:  Calculations  from  NSS  surveys  for  adult  male  workers  aged  15-65  years.  See  the  Data 
Appendix for details. 
 
There are considerable differences in the characteristics of regular and casual workers 
with respect to urban/rural residence, social status, ownership of physical assets and 
human capital, and wages as revealed in the summary statistics of the variables used 
in subsequent econometric analysis in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
 
Casual  wage  workers  reside  predominantly  in  rural  areas  and  have  a  higher  than 
average  proportion  belonging  to  scheduled  castes  and  tribes.
4  In  rural  areas 
households where the head is engaged in casual wage employment (about 23% of all 
rural households) possess about half as much land as households headed by regular 
workers  (about  9%  of  rural  households).  While  casual  workers  are  predominantly 
illiterate, barely literate  or have completed primary school the majority of regular 
workers  have  completed  secondary  school.  In  1983,  the  only  year  where  this 
information was available, the years of schooling acquired by regular workers was 
almost five times higher than that by casual workers. As an indicator of informality, a 
large proportion of casual workers were engaged in subsidiary work in addition to 
their main work (see Table 2). Regular workers are generally covered under social 
security benefits –the 1999 survey reveals that 57% of regular workers while only 1% 
of casual workers were covered under some type of provident fund scheme. 
 
Table 2: Profile of regular and casual workers 
   Regular workers  Casual workers 
   1983  1993  1999  1983  1993  1999 
Real weekly wage (Rs.)  141.48  206.81  267.03  45.02  62.02  74.19 
Share of wages in kind in total wages (%)  10.68  7.92  9.07  27.95  25.60  24.43 
Share engaged in subsidiary work (%)  9.91  11.43  7.75  31.26  33.57  27.49 
Poverty incidence (Headcount ratio, %):             
Urban  24.89  17.13  14.54  59.70  54.70  50.13 
Rural  29.76  16.63  14.75  58.61  47.68  41.96 
Total observations     27,356   26,387   27,295   28,855   26,398   29,805 
Note: The classification of workers is on the basis of weekly status. The sample size is that used in the 
subsequent  econometric  analysis.  Official  poverty  line  for  rural  areas:  Rs.89.50,  Rs.  205.84,  Rs. 
327.56; urban areas: Rs.115.65, Rs. 281.35 and Rs. 454.11(World Bank, 2002).    
                                                 
4 These terms are derived from the schedules of the Constitution Orders passed in 1950 that listed the 
names of specific castes and tribes that were eligible for special treatment from the State in terms of 
reservations in public sector employment, legislatures and government-funded educational institutions 
(Das, 2003).    7
 
An increase in casualisation has implications for inequality as casual workers earn 
lower wages than regular workers. They  are also more likely to be poor – casual 
workers have headcount ratios almost ten percentage points higher and almost twenty 
percentage points higher than the average in rural and urban areas respectively (see 
Table 2). 
 
To  summarise,  casual  workers  have  lower  physical  and  human  capital  relative  to 
regular wage workers and this is reflected in the low earnings. Presumably casual 
workers are also more vulnerable to shocks due to the temporary nature of their work. 
This conforms to the notion of poor and marginal workers competing in a distinct 
labour market (Heckman and Hotz, 1986).
5 Regular wage employment is taken as 
analogous  to  the  ‘primary  labour  market’  and  casual  wage  employment  to  the 
‘secondary labour market’ in the dual labour market literature. 
 
2.2. Wage inequality between regular and casual workers  
 
Table  3  reveals  that  though  regular  workers  comprise  roughly  half  of  all  wage 
workers their income share is about three-quarters. The wage gap between casual and 
regular workers is substantial and increased during this period – the average mark-up 
of regular over casual hourly wage was as high as 189% in 1983, rising to 230% by 
1999.
6 Conversely, in 1983 an average casual worker in the labour market earned 
about 35% of the hourly wage earned by an average regular worker; by 1999 this had 
fallen  to  30%.  Wage  inequality  as  measured  by  the  Gini  coefficient  and  two 
generalised entropy measures, the mean log deviation and Theil index, is higher for 
regular workers and has risen during the 1990s.
7 This is reflected in the rising wage 
gap between regular workers educated till the graduate level or higher and those with 
primary education. Wage inequality for casual workers, on the other hand, fell during 
this  period  as  did  the  wage  gap  between  the  highest  and  lowest  educational 
qualifications.  
                                                 
5 The differences are apparent in Table A1 in the Appendix of the summary statistics for the variables 
used in the subsequent econometric analysis. 
6  This  is  the  percentage  ‘mark-up’  of  average  regular  over  casual  wage  and  is  computed  as 
CW CW RW W W W / ) ( * 100 - , rw stands for regular and cw for casual wage workers.  
7 See Figure A1 in the Appendix for kernel distribution plots of wages for these two types of workers.   8
 
Table 3: Wage inequality  
Panel A: Inequality measures, 1983-1999 
   Regular workers  Casual workers 
   1983  1993  1999  1983  1993  1999 
Mean wage  3.1092  4.5037  5.7850  1.0824  1.4480  1.7437 
  (2.72)  (3.48)  (5.40)  (0.77)  (0.74)  (0.93) 
Median wage  2.6042  3.7431  4.4467  0.9197  1.2959  1.5554 
Population share (%)  48.67  49.99  47.80  51.33  50.01  52.20 
Income share (%)  73.14  75.66  75.24  26.86  24.34  24.76 
Mean wage by education:             
Literate  1.1654  1.4718  1.7763  2.1277  2.7439  3.3216 
Primary  2.2813  2.7596  3.4419  1.2547  1.6012  1.8956 
Middle  2.6743  3.2265  3.9571  1.3118  1.6726  1.9597 
Secondary  3.8915  4.6547  5.9684  1.4042  1.6182  2.0036 
Graduate  5.7181  7.1968  9.5482  1.6344  1.5361  2.0918 
Ratio graduate-primary wage  2.5065  2.6079  2.7741  1.3027  0.9593  1.1035 
Wage inequality measures:             
Gini coefficient  0.39395  0.39434  0.43009  0.29228  0.26485  0.26335 
  (0.0022)  (0.0017)  (0.0021)  (0.0022)  (0.0013)  (0.0014) 
Mean log deviation, MLD  0.28579  0.31720  0.33812  0.14328  0.15290  0.11738 
  (0.0031)  (0.0032)  (0.0033)  (0.0025)  (0.0026)  (0.0013) 
Theil index  0.27490  0.25925  0.31571  0.15913  0.12019  0.11913 
  (0.0042)  (0.0026)  (0.0055)  (0.0054)  (0.0013)  (0.0018) 
Sample size           27,356        26,387        27,295        28,855        26,398        29,805 
 
Panel B: Decomposition of overall wage inequality by employment status 
   1983  1993  1999 
Industry  MLD  Theil  MLD  Theil  MLD  Theil 
Overall wage inequality   0.3469  0.3678  0.3880  0.3637  0.3953  0.4236 
Within-status inequality  0.2126  0.2438  0.2350  0.2254  0.2229  0.2670 
Contribution (%)  (61.30)  (66.29)  (60.57)  (61.97)  (56.38)  (63.03) 
Between-status inequality  0.1343  0.1240  0.1530  0.1383  0.1724  0.1566 
Contribution (%)  (38.70)  (33.71)  (39.43)  (38.03)  (43.62)  (36.97) 
Note: Real hourly wage (Rs.) in constant 1983 prices. The inequality measures are computed without 
applying  household  weights  (the  results  are  very  similar  with  weights).  Figures  in  parenthesis  are 
standard deviation for the mean wage and standard errors for the inequality measures obtained by 
bootstrapping with 1000 replications. 
 
Generalised entropy inequality measures are decomposable into within- and between- 
group components for population sub-groups as here. The decomposition of the mean 
log deviation and Theil index (Panel B of Table 3) reveals that inequality between 
these two groups of workers explains over one-third of overall wage inequality. These 
estimates  of  the  wage  gap  and  wage  inequality,  however,  are  uncorrected  for 
differences in the observable individual characteristics that determine wages.    9
 
3. Estimating an empirical model
8  
 
Wage regression models are estimated as augmented Mincerian earnings equations 
controlling  for  human  capital  and  various  other  characteristics.  Before  the  wage 
regression models are estimated the issue of potential selection bias is addressed using 
the generalised framework popularised by Lee (1983).
9 Consider the following two-
stage model for selection and wage determination (suppressing the i subscripts for 
individuals):  
 
j j j j x w m b + = '               j = 2, 3   (1) 
s s s s z y h g - = '
*               s = 1,2,3  (2) 
 
wherewis the outcome variable (in this case, log wages) that is observed only for 
persons  engaged  in  wage  employment  of  two  types  (denoted  by  the  categorical 
variable j) – regular wage employment (j = 2) and casual wage employment (j = 3). 
The latent dependent variable (
*
s y ) represents the employment status of the individual 
- (i) non-wage earners comprising non-participants in the labour market, self-employed 
and  unemployed  individuals,  (ii)  regular  wage  employment  and  (iii)  casual  wage 
employment. The vectors xj and zs comprise exogenous explanatory variables, s is a 
categorical  variable  signifying  selection  between  the  above  three  different 
alternatives,    j m   and  s h   are  random  error  terms  such  that  0 ) ; | ( = s j s z x E m   and 
0 ) ; | ( = s j s z x E h .  
 
Previous studies (Duraisamy, 2002; Kingdon and Unni, 2001) have used the Heckman 
(1979) procedure by modelling the selection process as a dichotomous realisation into 
wage and non-wage employment. However, the empirical analysis above revealed 
                                                 
8 This section is based on Lee (1983). 
9 The sample of individuals over which a wage function can be estimated is essentially truncated as 
data on wages as well as industry affiliation is reported only for those individuals in wage employment. 
If the selection of this sub-sample of individuals is random then an ordinary least squares procedure 
provides consistent and unbiased estimates of the coefficients. If this selection of individuals into wage 
employment is systematic (i.e., the error terms in the selection equation and the wage equation are 
correlated  in  some  way)  then  ignoring  the  non-random  nature  of  the  sample  would  introduce  a 
selectivity bias in the wage regression model’s estimates.   10
that there are considerable differences between the two kinds of wage employment. In 
addition, as the selection bias is mediated through observed wages it is sufficient and 
computationally  more  convenient  to  separate  employment  status  into  non-wage 
earners and two different types of wage earners.  
 
If the  s h s are assumed to be independent and identically distributed as Type I extreme 
value distributions their difference (i.e., between different employment status) follows 
a logistic distribution. This gives rise to the conditional Multinomial Logit (MNL) 



















            s, j = 1,…,3    (3) 
 
The MNL model is identified only up to an additive vector. As a result one set of 
parameters ( s g ) must be selected as the base category and set to zero in order to 
overcome the indeterminacy inherent in the MNL model. Equation (3) then reduces to 




































     0 1 = g ; s = 2,3; j = 2,3   (4) 
     
In this paper outcome one (i.e., non-wage earners) is taken as the base category and 
the  other  two  sets  are  estimated  relative  to  this  category.  In  order  to  identify  the 
parameters of the wage equations a set of variables that influence employment status 
between the alternative outcomes but not wage itself must be included as regressors in 
the selection equation. In the absence of data on exogenous household non-labour 
income  or  family  background  (e.g.,  parental  education  or  socio-economic 
background)  variables  capturing  household  structure  through  dependents  and 
household size are used in this paper (see Section 4 below).  
   11
Consistent estimates of the parameters ( j b ) in the outcome equation can be obtained 
by replacing the disturbance terms  j m  in equation (1) by their conditional expected 
value obtained from the MNL estimation (equation 4). This selection bias correction 



















l             j = 2, 3              (5) 
 
where  (.) f  and  (.) F  represent the standard normal density and distribution functions 
respectively,  J(.)  represents  the  ‘normits’  or  the  standardised  z-scores  for  each 
observation -  (.)) ( (.)
1 F J
- F = . It follows that  ) ( ) (
1 '
j j j j P z J
- F = g  where Pj is the 
probability of being in outcome j (j = 2, 3). 
 
Thus,  using  the  predicted  probabilities  from  the  reduced  form  MNL  model  the 
selection  bias  correction  term  (l j)  can  be  constructed  for  each  individual  for 
outcomes two and three (i.e., regular and casual wage employment respectively) and 
included in the corresponding wage equations to control for potential selection bias. 
An augmented semi-logarithmic Mincerian specification can then be used to estimate 
the wage equations (Mincer, 1970): 
 
j j j j j j x w u l b b + - = ˆ '
*             j = 2,3              (6) 
 
where  subscript  j  =  2,  3  refers  to  regular  and  casual  workers  respectively, 
j j j m s r b =
*   the  coefficient  on  the  selection  bias  correction  term  in  the  wage 
equations; j r   the  coefficient  of  correlation  between  the  error  terms  in  the  wage 
equation  and  the  selection  equation  (the  direction  of  bias  is  determined  by  this 
correlation term); and  j u  the error term for each of the wage equations. 
   12
This  two-step  procedure  controls  for  the  underlying  process  by  which  the  set  of 
observations actually observed are generated.
10 It ensures that the OLS estimates of 
the coefficients from the wage equations are consistent. The sampling distribution for 
the estimates can be obtained by using a modification to the  formula suggested in 
Trost and Lee (1984) or by bootstrapping. The latter procedure is adopted here and 
each of the wage regression models in this paper has been bootstrapped using 1000 
replications.  
 
4. Empirical Results: Wage regression models 
 
The  results  for  the  multinomial  model  for  selection  into  both  types  of  wage 
employment –regular and casual – relative to the base category of non-wage earners 
are  not  reported  here  due  to  lack  of  space.  The  explanatory  variables  are  worker 
characteristics  such  as  age,  the  highest  level  of  education  completed  and  marital 
status,  social  exclusion  operating  through  caste  and  religion,
11  and  controls  for 
location (settlement type and state of residence) and seasonality effects (proxied by 
the timing of the interview for the survey). As noted earlier, the parameters of the 
wage equations are identified using variables that capture household structure. These 
include the household size, the number of persons aged more than 65 years in the 
household and three dummy variables for whether the household has one child, two 
children or three or more children aged 0-4 years (the omitted category is not having 
any children aged 0-4 years).
12 The majority of the effects estimated are plausible and 
                                                 
10 Other methods of correcting for selection bias in polychotomous choice models have been developed 
by Hay for the conditional logit (cited in Maddala (1983)) and by Bourguignon, Fournier & Gurgand 
(2001) for the multinomial logit. Alternatively, semi-parametric selection correction methods that relax 
the assumption concerning the joint distribution of the error terms can be used. The Lee correction was 
chosen  because  of  its  simplicity,  computational  convenience  and  transparent  interpretation  of  the 
selection effect. It should be noted that parameter estimates of the  wage equations obtained using 
power series approximations for the selection term following the semi-parametric approach advocated 
by Newey (1999) were very similar to those obtained by using the Lee correction.  
11  Social  exclusion  can  be  thought  of  as  the  process  by  which  certain  groups  are  continuously 
marginalized or excluded in society (Das, 2003). Nayak (1994) conceptualises the problem of social 
exclusion as being “one of lack of entitlement of economic and social power amongst a large section of 
the population” where “the notion of entitlement refers to the actual or effective empowerment of a 
person to trade his original endowment of labour power and other factor incomes for food and other 
basic necessities” (pp.2).  
12 As the choice of identifying variables is  necessarily ad hoc the MNL  model  was estimated for 
different specifications of identifying variables. The parameter estimates in the wage equations are not 
sensitive to the choice of the identifying variables and the coefficient on the correction term itself was 
not materially different across specifications. On balance, these instruments were also not found to 
strongly influence wages in most specifications in most years.    13
are significant at the 1% level or better. Individuals who are educated, married with a 
large number of children and reside in urban areas are more likely to be in regular 
wage employment. The direction of effect of most of the variables remained stable 
across all three years with a few exceptions, mostly for the state effects in 1993. A 
Wald  test  for  the  validity  of  conflating  the  casual  and  regular  wage  employment 
categories was decisively rejected by the data for all three years.
13 It must be stressed 
that this approach is not an attempt at modelling participation in the labour market but 
one designed to obtain the necessary tools to control for potential selection bias in the 
wage regression models. 
 
The dependent variable for the wage equations is the natural log of real hourly wages. 
The explanatory variables used in the wage equations are: age and education as well 
as  controls  for  marital  status,  social  exclusion,  location,  seasonality  and  industry 
affiliation.
14 The selection bias correction terms are constructed from the predicted 
probabilities from the MNL above and the wage equations are estimated as described 
in Section 3. The results are reported in Table 4 below (the estimated coefficients for 
the 37 industry and 16 state dummies are reported in Table A2).  
 
Table 4: Wage regression for regular and casual workers 
Dependent variable: Natural log of real hourly wages 
   Regular wage workers     Casual wage workers    
   1983  1993  1999  1983  1993  1999 
Individual characteristics:             
Age spline: 15-25 years  0.0139***  0.0106***  0.0130***  0.0106***  0.0136***  0.0137*** 
  (0.0017)  (0.0024)  (0.0022)  (0.0007)  (0.0009)  (0.0010) 
Age spline: 25-35 years  0.0174***  0.0165***  0.0203***  -0.0008  -0.0009  0.0019*** 
  (0.0008)  (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0006) 
Age spline: 35-45 years  0.0106***  0.0158***  0.0160***  -0.0015**  -0.0003  -0.0007 
  (0.0008)  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0006)  (0.0007)  (0.0006) 
Age spline: 45-55 years  0.0055***  0.0129***  0.0159***  -0.0007  -0.0043***  -0.0033*** 
  (0.0013)  (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0008)  (0.0009)  (0.0009) 
Age spline: 55-65 years  -0.0291***  -0.0304***  -0.0252***  -0.0052***  -0.0053***  -0.0034** 
  (0.0031)  (0.0049)  (0.0046)  (0.0013)  (0.0015)  (0.0014) 
Married  0.0647***  0.0781***  0.0878***  0.0271***  0.0327***  0.0196*** 
  (0.0073)  (0.0095)  (0.0102)  (0.0037)  (0.0045)  (0.0043) 
Education:             
Completed primary school  0.0658***  0.0426***  0.0485***  0.0088  0.0108*  0.0227*** 
                                                 
13 The
2 c statistics (40 degrees of freedom) are 19087.91, 21281.50 and 22068.91 for the three years 
respectively. 
14 See Table A1 in the Appendix for the summary statistics of these variables.   14
  (0.0072)  (0.0100)  (0.0114)  (0.0057)  (0.0057)  (0.0056) 
Completed middle school  0.1361***  0.0933***  0.1090***  -0.0065  -0.0079  0.0165* 
  (0.0085)  (0.0120)  (0.0115)  (0.0092)  (0.0092)  (0.0085) 
Completed secondary school  0.3486***  0.2640***  0.2945***  -0.0085  -0.0348**  0.0117 
  (0.0110)  (0.0160)  (0.0140)  (0.0174)  (0.0154)  (0.0147) 
Completed graduate school  0.6192***  0.5385***  0.6025***  -0.0043  -0.0693*  0.0180 
  (0.0150)  (0.0229)  (0.0188)  (0.0540)  (0.0381)  (0.0318) 
Social exclusion:             
Member of scheduled caste or tribe -0.0472***  -0.0389***  -0.0309***  -0.0033  0.0111*  -0.0060 
  (0.0056)  (0.0074)  (0.0072)  (0.0051)  (0.0060)  (0.0059) 
Muslim  -0.0163**  -0.0328***  -0.0436***  0.0249***  0.0245***  0.0130** 
  (0.0075)  (0.0093)  (0.0092)  (0.0049)  (0.0055)  (0.0053) 
Seasonality:             
Household interviewed in (season):            
2nd quarter  -0.0218***  0.0052  0.0029  0.0008  -0.0011  -0.0022 
  (0.0073)  (0.0082)  (0.0089)  (0.0097)  (0.0093)  (0.0085) 
3rd quarter  -0.0293***  -0.0230**  -0.0056  -0.0375***  -0.0386***  -0.0002 
  (0.0073)  (0.0098)  (0.0091)  (0.0092)  (0.0098)  (0.0093) 
4th quarter  -0.0424***  -0.0057  -0.0051  -0.0348***  -0.0414***  -0.0190** 
  (0.0075)  (0.0085)  (0.0090)  (0.0094)  (0.0096)  (0.0088) 
Rural * 1st quarter  -0.0098  0.0134  0.0156  -0.0050  0.0145  0.0256*** 
  (0.0123)  (0.0160)  (0.0163)  (0.0104)  (0.0102)  (0.0094) 
Rural * 2nd quarter  -0.0170  0.0678***  0.0028  -0.0004  0.0393***  -0.0152 
  (0.0123)  (0.0167)  (0.0176)  (0.0098)  (0.0109)  (0.0103) 
Rural * 3rd quarter  0.0310***  0.0271*  -0.0249  0.0154  0.0548***  0.0131 
  (0.0120)  (0.0164)  (0.0161)  (0.0100)  (0.0105)  (0.0097) 
Location:             
Residence in rural areas  -0.1454***  -0.0468**  -0.0240  -0.0972***  -0.0479***  -0.0329*** 
  (0.0141)  (0.0207)  (0.0166)  (0.0082)  (0.0079)  (0.0076) 
             
Selectivity bias correction term  -0.0202  -0.1152***  -0.1149***  0.0610***  0.0682***  0.0391*** 
  (0.0174)  (0.0270)  (0.0228)  (0.0125)  (0.0129)  (0.0145) 
Selection effect  0.0231  0.1281***  0.1336***  -0.0726***  -0.0781***  -0.0448*** 
  (0.0228)  (0.0334)  (0.0308)  (0.0177)  (0.0169)  (0.0190) 
Constant  0.4375***  0.6996***  0.8532***  0.4263***  0.4483***  0.5710*** 
  (0.0579)  (0.0917)  (0.0846)  (0.0279)  (0.0324)  (0.0352) 
Number of observations           27,356          26,387          27,295          28,855          26,398          29,805 
R2  0.5458  0.4789  0.5298  0.3393  0.3058  0.3382 
Standard error of estimate  0.3483  0.4229  0.4477  0.2127  0.2318  0.2364 
Notes: 1/ Standard errors in parentheses (obtained after bootstrapping with 1000 replications). 2/ * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 3/ The estimated coefficients on the age 
splines are not cumulative. 4/ 37 industry dummy variables are included (5 agricultural and allied 
industries,  2  mining,  21  manufacturing  and  8  non-tradable  industries);  food  crops  is  the  omitted 
industry. 16 state dummies (West Bengal is the omitted state) are included. 5/ The selection effect is 
computed as the coefficient on the selectivity bias correction term times its mean for the nominated 
outcome - regular or casual wage employment - multiplied by 100. A crude estimate of the standard 
error of the selection effect is obtained as follows: the square of the average selection bias correction 
term times the standard error of its estimated coefficient. 
 
The explanatory power of the variables in all three years is quite high, especially for 
regular wage workers, though the fits appear poorer in the second year. The standard 
error  of  the  estimate  quantifies  the  deviation  of  data  points  around  the  regression   15
plane. This has increased by about 10 and 2.4 percentage points for regular and casual 
workers respectively between 1983 and 1999. The majority of the estimated effects 
have  the  expected  signs  and  are  significant  at  the  1%  level  or  better  (other  than 
seasonality). The returns to education, the primary focus of this paper, are examined 
in detail in the next section after discussing the other explanatory variables here.   
 
Selection effects 
The  selection  effects  are  highly  significant  for  both  regular  and  casual  workers. 
Individuals selected into regular wage employment are likely to earn higher wages 
than  a  person  randomly  selected  from  the  population  and  this  effect  has  risen 
substantially in the 1990s from zero in 1983 to a significant 13% in the later years.
15 
Kingdon  and  Unni  (2001)  also  find  a  significant  positive  selection  effect  for  all 
workers  in  their  state  samples.  It  is  possible  that  individuals  with  desirable 
unobservable characteristics such as better ability, motivation, etc. are absorbed into 
regular wage employment. 
 
Conversely, casual workers tend to earn about 6-7% lower wages than an individual 
selected  at  random  from  the  population  in  the  first  two  years.  By  1999  this 
disadvantage had fallen and casual workers earned about 4% less than a randomly 
selected individual in 1999. This is plausible as the reference category includes self-
employed and unemployed individuals who presumably have the resources to engage 
in self-owned enterprises or to afford the time taken to obtain regular employment. 
Some researchers have argued that employers resorted to hiring casual workers and/or 
contracting  in  response  to  liberalisation  (Deshpande  and  Deshpande,  1998).  The 
employment data reveals that the share of casual workers in heavy manufacturing 
increased during the 1990s. This process could conceivably raise the wages of casual 
workers (though below those of regular workers) so that the negative selection effect 
falls.  
 
The empirical analysis in Section 2.2. revealed that the raw wage gap between regular 
and casual workers was substantial and that it increased during the 1990s - an average 
casual  worker  earned  about  35%  of  the  real  hourly  wages  of  an  average  regular 
                                                 
15 It should be noted that the sign on the coefficient in equation (6) is negative.     16
worker in 1983; by 1999 this had fallen to 30%. Estimates of wages after controlling 
for  individual  observable  productivity  (as  proxied  by  education),  other  individual 
characteristics, state of residence and industry affiliation are obtained from the wage 
regression models. The wage gap based on these predicted values are much lower and 
suggest exactly the opposite trend – casual hourly wages as a proportion of regular 
wages rose marginally from 55% in 1983 to 57% in 1999. This reflects the decline in 




Age serves as a proxy for labour market experience as the employment surveys do not 
report data on actual labour market experience and there is insufficient information to 
construct a potential labour market experience variable without introducing additional 
noise in the data. For adult males workers age is likely to be highly correlated with 
labour market experience. The standard quadratic form for age is not used as this did 
not fit the data well and following Murphy and Welch (1990) age splines at ten-year 
intervals were included instead.
16 Figure 1 plots the age-earnings profiles for both 
types of workers.  
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Note: RW stands for regular workers and CW for casual workers  
 
 
The  age-earnings  profiles  for  regular  and  casual  workers  display  a  positive 
relationship  between  age  and  real  hourly  wages,  and  the  general  shape  is  in 
accordance  with  the  prediction  of  human  capital  theory  and  previous  empirical 
                                                 
16  Ten  year  intervals  were  chosen  in  order  to  maintain  a  balance  between  tighter  splines  and 
comparability between the three years and for both types of workers.    17
research (Murphy and Welch, 1990). These are concave in all three years indicating 
that wages increase at a declining rate till they reach a peak and start falling.
17 The 
difference in the returns to age for the two workers is striking. For regular workers the 
returns  to  age  peak  at  the  45-55  age  group  before  declining  whereas    for  casual 
workers the returns to age rise very steeply initially for the 15-25 age group and then 
virtually  flatten  out.  The  multinomial  model  revealed  that  younger  and  more 
inexperienced  individuals  had  a  higher  probability  of  obtaining  casual  wage 
employment while the age profile for regular workers was more diffuse. It is possible 
that tenure has an effect on the wages of regular workers but not casual workers who, 
by  definition,  have  unstable  jobs.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  existence  of 
distinct primary and secondary labour markets where the latter has little or no returns 
to experience (Dickens and Lang, 1985).  
 
The  age-earnings  profile  has  clearly  shifted  up  during  these  three  years  for  both 
regular and casual workers - a Wald test of the coefficients on the age splines rejects 
the null hypothesis of no movement between each pair of years for both types of 
workers.
18 This steepening of the curve for regular workers and the increasing return 
to age for casual workers until the age of 35 years combined with the rising standard 
error  of  estimates  in  the  wage  equations  indicate  an  increase  in  the  returns  to 
unobservable skills that could possibly be related to the liberalisation process. 
 
Marriage has a positive effect on both regular and casual wage – a married individual 
will earn about 6-9% higher wages than an unmarried individual if he is in regular 
wage employment and 2-3% higher if he is in casual wage employment. However 
being married can be endogenous to wages – individuals earning wages may be more 
likely to be married (Kingdon, 1998). 
 
                                                 
17 Since these are cross-section data the age-earnings profile refers to the wage received by different 
workers at different age groups. They do not trace the earnings of an individual worker over time. 
Comparisons of returns to age over time are for cohorts of workers falling in the same age groups in the 
three years.  
18 The
2 c statistics (5 degrees of freedom) are 95.78 between 1983 and 1993, 24.54 between 1993 and 
1999 and 193.21 between 1983 and 1999 for regular workers and 22.36, 20.52 and 66.42 for the three 
years for casual workers.   18
Social exclusion 
It  is  argued  that  “the  caste  system  confines  those  from  lower  castes  to  a  limited 
number of poorly paid,  often socially stigmatised occupational niches from which 
there  is  little  escape…”  (Kabeer,  2002:  pp.3).  Ethnicity  is  also  often  a  source  of 
exclusion – in India this translates into exclusion on the basis of religion and is largely 
applicable to the Indian Muslims. Certain other religious minorities, such as Sikhs, 
Jains and Buddhists, are historically entrenched in the predominantly Hindu society 
while others, such as Christians and Zoroastrians, have established also their group 
status  in  society.  On  the  other  hand,  Muslims  are  the  largest  and  heterogeneous 
minority within India and have historically been viewed as separate and this makes 
them more likely to be excluded (Das, 2003).  
 
Mutually exclusive dummy variables for caste and religion affiliation (relative to all 
other individuals belonging to other religions  and castes)  are included  in order to 
capture possible post-employment discrimination. This could take the form of low 
wages either due to lack of opportunities to rise or because of crowding into certain 
occupations within an industry (Nayak, 1994). Table 4 reveals that belonging to a 
scheduled caste (or tribe) or being Muslim significantly decreases the wage received 
by regular workers in all three years while the opposite is the case for casual workers. 
The disadvantage faced by Muslims in the regular labour market has increased over 
time. Kingdon and Unni (2001) find no significant effect of caste or religion in their 
study but while this may be true for urban areas in the two states they examined it 
might not be case for India as a whole. As the direction of effect is different for the 
two types of workers it is possible that estimating wage regression models for all 
wage workers together masks this differential effect. 
 
These variables, however, are also likely to capture the effects of omitted variables 
such as occupation and/or family background. Occupation variables have not been 
included in these wage regression models as the classification is very similar to the 
industrial  classification.  Traditionally  individuals  belonging  to  scheduled  castes  or 
tribes have been associated with low-wage occupations. The survey data reveals that 
the largest proportion (greater than the economy average) of scheduled caste workers 
are  engaged  in  agricultural  and  allied  occupations  while  Muslims  are  engaged  in 
production, construction and transport work. In both cases these occupations paid less   19
than the average wage in all three years. The differential effects across type of wage 
employment probably reflects the fact that casual workers are concentrated in these 
industries – agricultural and allied activities and construction. In addition, the positive 
wage effect for casual Muslim workers might reflect the fact that many traditional 
skills such as weaving, trading and craftsmanship practised by Muslim workers are 
highly valued by the majority (Das, 2003).  
 
Using data drawn from a purpose-designed survey in urban areas of Lucknow district 
in Uttar Pradesh in 1995 Kingdon (1998) finds that individuals belonging to “low and 
backward castes” (pp. 7) earn significantly less than general caste individuals. This 
effect  is  significant  only  when  there  are  no  controls  for  family  background  (as 
measured by father’s years of schooling). Once this variable is included the negative 
effect of caste is no longer significant indicating that these individuals do not face 
direct discrimination in the labour market. Instead “… their earnings disadvantage 
obtains  indirectly  from  their  more  deprived  backgrounds  which  may  influence 
earnings indirectly via lower out of school investments in learning and lower quality 
education, or indeed, via less influential connections in the job market” (pp.11). A 
similar argument could be applied to Muslim workers in regular wage employment. In 
1983 the average years of schooling for adult male regular workers that were Muslim 
or members of scheduled castes or tribes was 6.05 and 4.96 years respectively while 
for all other individuals this was much higher at 8.45 years. For Muslim or scheduled 
caste  casual  workers  the  average  years  of  schooling  is  1.60  and  1.47  years 
respectively  compared  to  2.56  years  for  all  other  workers.  In  terms  of  poverty 
incidence as well these two social groups have a proportion below the poverty line 
that is much higher than that of all other households. In particular, the fact that the 
pre-employment discrimination towards Muslims in regular wage  employment fell 
during this period and was no longer significant in 1999 as indicated by estimates 
from the reduced form multinomial model suggests the negative wage effect might be 
attributed  to  omitted  occupation  and  family  background  effects  rather  than  post-
employment discrimination.  
 
Location and seasonal control variables 
Residing  in  rural  areas  significantly  reduces  the  wage  received  for  both  types  of 
workers but this disadvantage declined significantly after 1983. The seasonal effects   20
(interacted with settlement type) are jointly significant
19 -  working in any season 
other than the first quarter of the year tends to reduce the wage received, though this 
is  less  pronounced  or  even  reversed  for  rural  areas.  The  state  dummy  variables 
(relative to the omitted state, West Bengal) are significant determinants of wages for 
both regular and casual workers indicating the presence of constraints on inter-state 
mobility  possibly  arising  out  of  geographic,  language  or  ethnic  barriers  and/or 




The industry effects for the 37 industry dummies included in the wage regression 
models (relative to the omitted industry, food crops) are all significant at the 1% level 
or better.
21 High wage sectors for regular workers are mining and fuel extraction, 
heavy manufacturing such as base metal and industrial machinery industry, services 
such as banking and insurance, railway transport services and utilities. High wage 
sectors  for  casual  workers  are  mining  and  fuel  extraction,  light  manufacturing 
industries such as wood and jute textiles, railway and other transport services and 
construction.  Low  wage  sectors  for  both  regular  and  casual  workers  comprise 
agricultural and allied sectors such as food, cash and plantation crops and animal 
husbandry, and light manufacturing such as beverages and tobacco. Casual workers in 
heavy manufacturing such as sea, rail and motor and all other transport equipment 
while  regular  workers  in  wholesale  and  retail  trade  and  services  such  as  legal, 
business,  personal  and  community  services  are  also  paid  lower  than  the  average 
worker.  
 
5. Returns to education 
 
This section examines in detail the returns to education for both regular and casual 
workers and the changes in these returns following the economic liberalisation of the 
1990s.  
                                                 
19 The
2 c statistics (6 degrees of freedom) are 61.47, 21.20 and 11.83 for regular workers and 143.73, 
51.81 and 97.66 for casual workers for the three years respectively. 
20 The joint
2 c statistics (16 degrees of freedom) are 961.57, 677.86 and 943.77 for regular workers 
and 5105.65, 4550.52 and 6587.96 for casual workers for the three years respectively. 
21 The
2 c statistics (37 degrees of freedom) are 2858.10, 2265.92 and 3527.80 for regular workers and 
1578.40, 1920.12 and 2128.88 for casual workers for the three years respectively.   21
 
In  common  with  other  studies  the  marginal  wage  effects  of  education  for  regular 
workers are significantly positive and monotonically increasing in education level – a 
regular worker who has completed primary school earned about 7% higher than one 
with no education while a graduate earned as much as 62% higher wages in 1983.
22 
For casual workers acquiring education till primary school raises the wage received 
by about 1-2%. The estimated marginal wage effects of education above the middle 
school level are significantly negative in 1993 though this trend is reversed in the last 
year (significantly so for middle school). 
 
The private rate of return per year of education at different education levels can be 
computed  using  the  coefficients  from  the  wage  equations.  These  serve  as  useful 
indicators of the productivity of education and also the incentive for individuals to 
invest in their human capital (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002). If the returns to 
education are different for different groups participating in the labour market this will 
affect the perceived economic benefits of education among these groups (Kingdon, 
1998). The NSS surveys after 1983 do not report the number of years of schooling, 
only the maximum level of schooling completed that allows the construction of the 
five education dummy variables used in the selection and wage regression models. 
Since education policy is a subject under state jurisdiction the schooling systems (at 
least until the secondary school) vary somewhat across states. In general, most states 
follow five years of primary, three years of middle, four years of secondary (including 
higher secondary) schooling and three years (four if a technical degree) of graduate 
education (Duraisamy, 2002).
23 The average rate of return to each education level, rj, 















                  (7) 
                                                 
22 The omitted category for the education dummy variables is those who are illiterate or have less than 
two years of any type of formal education. 
23 The 1983 survey has additional information on the number of years of schooling and somewhat 
confirms this correspondence – on average individuals that had completed primary, middle, secondary 
and graduate education had done so in 5.18, 8.17, 10.79 and 14.16 years respectively.    22
where j = primary, middle, secondary or graduate school,  j b  is the coefficient in the 
wage regression models (equation 6) and Yj the years of schooling at education level j. 








Table 5: Average private rate of return to education levels (%) 
   Regular workers  Casual workers 
   1983  1993  1999  1983  1993  1999 
Primary school    1.32***  0.85***  0.97***  0.18  0.22*  0.45*** 
  (0.0015)  (0.0021)  (0.0023)  (0.0011)  (0.0012)  (0.0010) 
Middle school   2.35***  1.69***  2.02***  -0.51**  -0.63***  -0.20 
  (0.0025)  (0.0031)  (0.0034)  (0.0025)  (0.0024)  (0.0021) 
Secondary school   5.31***  4.27***  4.64***  -0.05  -0.67**  -0.12 
  (0.0019)  (0.0023)  (0.0022)  (0.0034)  (0.0027)  (0.0024) 
Graduate school   9.02***  9.15***  10.26***  0.14  -1.15  0.21 
   (0.0029)  (0.0036)  (0.0032)  (0.0168)  (0.0113)  (0.0087) 
Note: *** significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% level. The figures in parenthesis 
are standard errors computed as follows:  
 
Table 5 above suggests that there is an incentive to acquire high levels of education if 
the individual is in regular wage employment - returns to acquiring education are 
positive and monotonically increasing in education level. The estimated returns to 
education for casual workers are not as well determined as for regular workers.
24 For 
casual workers, while an additional year of primary schooling does contribute to the 
wage earned, at least during the 1990s, it is much lower than that for regular workers. 
There is no incentive to acquire education higher than primary schooling for a casual 
worker as there are at best flat returns to education. Indeed, the returns to completing 
middle school are negative. This indicates that either there is a low demand for skill or 
that the acquired skills are not useful in the casual labour market. This is supported by 
the  multinomial  model  where  education  at  any  level  has  a  negative  effect  on  the 
probability of being in casual wage employment. This is also consistent with the dual 
labour market literature on the existence of “a distinct low-wage (secondary) labour 
market in which there are no returns to schooling” (Dickens and Lang, 1985, pp. 792). 
Since workers are largely seen as homogenous there is little or no return to education 
                                                 
24 This reflects in part the low proportion of educated individuals in casual wage employment – for 
instance less than 1% of casual workers were graduates (about 50 individuals) in 1983 (see Table A1 in 
the Appendix).    23
in the secondary labour market. The difference in the pattern of and trends in returns 
to education for these two types of workers is highlighted in Figure 2. 
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Estimates of returns to education can be overstated due to biases arising from omitted 
variables, especially natural ability, schooling quality, socio-economic background,  
economic sector and sample selection (Bennell, 1996b; Heckman and Hotz, 1986; 
Kingdon,  1998).  The  wage  regression  models  estimated  in  this  paper  control  for 
selection bias and industry affiliation and to some extent socio-economic background 
using caste and religion affiliation. These models do not include variables capturing 
school quality and family background. Though years of schooling does capture some 
aspects of schooling – poor quality at low levels of schooling will influence whether 
or not an individual goes on to the next level – it does so only partially. In the Indian 
context the quality of schooling varies widely and seems to depend a great deal on the 
family background, though perhaps not as much for boys (Kingdon, 1998). Kingdon 
also finds that the returns to schooling (the number of years of education) fall from 
10.6% to 8.9% for men once variables capturing family background (such as parental 
education)  are  included  in  the  1995  study  of  urban  Uttar  Pradesh.  In  addition, 
omitting family background was found to overestimate the returns to education at the 
graduate  and  higher  levels  as  individuals  who  acquire  higher  education  generally 
belong to privileged backgrounds so that some part of their return to education arises 
from their backgrounds (Kingdon, 1998). It is not possible, however, to control for   24
either  of  these  variables  with  the  available  data.
25  To  the  extent  that  household 
structure  (in  the  selection  model),  caste  and  religion  variables  capture  family 
background this bias is less serious.  
 
The  results  for  regular  workers  reported  in  Table  5  above  are  at  odds  with  the 
conventional pattern of returns to education in other countries. A review of various 
studies  in  different  countries  by  Psacharopoulos  &  Patrinos  (2002)  suggests  that 
returns are highest for primary education (about 26.6% world-wide and 20% in non-
OECD  Asian  countries)  and  are  decreasing  in  education  level.  This  empirical 
regularity has been called into question by several studies, especially in African and 
some Asian countries (see for example, Bennell (1995; 1996a; 1996b) for a cross-
country review; Siphambe (2000) for Botswana, Glewwe (1991) for Ghana, Sahn & 
Alderman (1988) for Malaysia, Moll (1996) for South Africa, Gindling, Goldfarb & 
Chang (1995) for Taiwan and Hawley (2004) for Thailand). In particular, Kingdon 
(1998) finds in her review of other empirical work on the returns to education in India 
(mainly computed from specialised surveys in urban areas of a particular state or city) 
that the rate of return to education, as in Table 5 above, tends to rise with education 
level.  In  order  to  place  the  findings  of  this  paper  in  the  context  of  the  existing 
literature Table 6 summarises estimates of the rate of return to education for male 
workers for low-income countries and for India (this paper’s estimates for regular 
workers  are  also  included  to  facilitate  comparison).  It  should  be  noted  that  these 
estimates are not comparable as they are drawn from studies that differ in the sample 
and  time  coverage,  the  measurement  of  wages,  the  specification  of  the  wage 
regression  models  and  the  treatment  of  selection,  and  are  based  on  different 
assumptions about the number of years at each level of schooling (see footnotes to 
Table 6 for details). 
 
Table 6: The private rate of return to education: a survey 
Study  Year  Region  Primary  Middle ‡  Secondary  Graduate 
World:              
Psacharapoulos-Patrinos  Latest   All countries  26.6  ..  17.0  19.0 
(all workers)    Low income countries  25.8  ..  19.9  26.0 
    Non-OECD Asian countries  20.0  ..  15.8  18.2 
                                                 
25 The NSS surveys include a variable for the relation of various household members to the household 
head. However it is not possible to use this to construct variables capturing parental education for the 
household head, his/her spouse, siblings etc.    25
India (male workers only):             
This study: regular workers   1983  India  1.3  2.4  5.3  9.0 
  1993-94  India  0.9  1.7  4.3  9.2 
  1999-00  India  1.0  2.0  4.6  10.3 
This study: regular workers   1983  India  2.3  3.1  6.0  9.4 
(without controls for selection 1993-94  India  1.9  2.9  5.6  10.8 
and industry affiliation) 1999-00  India  2.1  3.4  6.3  12.4 
Duraisamy (2002)
1  1983  India  6.1  7.1  13.2  12.2 
  1993-94  India  6.2  6.4  12.6  12.2 
Author's calculations
2  1983  India  7.0  8.1  11.7  15.5 
(based on Duraisamy)  1993-94  India  7.1  7.4  11.4  15.8 
Banerjee and Knight (1985)  1975-76  Delhi (urban)  2.4  ..  6.9  11.4 
Bennell (1995) citing Tilak 
3  1978  Andhra Pradesh (rural)  9.9  ..  3.2  7.0 
Kingdon (1998) 
4  1995  Lucknow (urban Uttar Pradesh)  2.6*  4.9  17.6     18.2 + 
Kingdon and Unni (2001)
5  1987-88  Madhya Pradesh (urban)  1.4*  6.9  14.2  9.6 
Kingdon (1998) citing Unni
6      Madhya Pradesh (urban)  3.1  9.7  12.0  13.5 
Kingdon (1998) citing Unni
6    Tamil Nadu (urban)  2.9  9.0  17.0  15.6 
Kingdon and Unni (2001)
 5  1987-88  Tamil Nadu (urban)  1.1*  6.4  12.4  17.1 
Santhapparaj (1997)
 7  1989  Madurai (urban Tamil Nadu)  -0.9*  0.1*  0.2*  18.5 
Source: Bennell (1995); Banerjee and Knight (1985); Duraisamy (2002); Kingdon (1998) for Kingdon 
(1998)  and  Unni  (1995);  Kingdon  and  Unni  (2001);  Psacharopoulos  and  Patrinos  (2002);  and 
Santhapparaj (1997). 
Notes: * These rates are insignificantly different from zero. + Taken as the average of all returns to 
post-secondary levels of education. ‡ The middle education level is equivalent to the junior education 
level reported in Kingdon (1998).  Duraisamy (2002), Kingdon and Unni (2001), Unni (1995) and the 
author’s calculations are computed from the NSS survey data; all others are based on smaller purpose-
defined surveys.  
1\ Duraisamy’s (2002) wage regression models are estimated for all rural and urban wage workers for 
both years also include a dummy for technical qualification but do not control for potential selection 
bias. Estimates for 1993-94 control for selection into wage employment but are almost identical to 
those  reported  above.  2\  Author’s  calculations  are  based  on  the  same  wage  regression  models  as 
Duraisamy.  These  estimates  are  higher  than  Duraisamy  as  the  dummy  variable  for  technical 
qualification has not been included due to non-availability of data. 3\ Bennell (1995) cites the work of 
Tilak, J.B.G. (1988). The Economics of Inequality in Education. New Delhi, Sage. These estimates 
differ from those reported in Psacharapoulos (1994) as they refer to the adjusted estimates (adjusting 
for  socio-economic  background,  labour  force  status,  type  of  employer  and  economic  sector).  4\ 
Estimates from Kingdon’s (1998) study is based on a sample of adult males aged 15-59 under the 
assumption of five, four, three and three years of schooling at each education level and control for 
selection into wage employment. 5\ Kingdon and Unni (2001) do not report the rates of return to these 
education levels. Those reported in the table above have been constructed from the coefficients from 
the wage equations on the education splines using their mapping of four, four, three and three years of 
schooling at each of these levels. The wage equations are estimated for adult males aged 15-64 years 
and control for selection into wage employment. 6\ Kingdon (1998) cites the work of Unni, J. (1995). 
Returns  to  Education  by  Gender  Among  Wage  Employees  in  Urban  India.  Gujarat  Institute  of 
Development  Research,  Ahmedabad.  Working  paper  No.  63.  7\  Santhapparaj’s  (1997)  estimates 
includes  migrants  and  natives  engaged  in  wage  and  self-employment.  Returns  to  education  are 
computed from the wage equation coefficients using the correspondence of five, three, four and three 
years.  
 
The estimates in Table 6 suggest that the findings of this paper are consistent with 
other work on the India labour market and that the conventional pattern of returns 
does not necessarily hold for India. The estimates for the private rate of return to 
education at different levels in the Indian studies indicate rising returns with the level   26
of  education  at  least  until  secondary  schooling  and  in  most  cases  until  graduate 
schooling. The exception is Bennell (1995) where the returns to primary education are 
higher  –  this  sample,  unlike  the  other  studies  on  urban  samples,  pertains  to  one 
predominantly rural district in a single state.  
 
Duraisamy (2002) is the only other national study that compares returns to education 
in India over time. A comparably specified OLS model with education, urban/rural 
residence and experience on male daily wages for a sample of all workers of all age 
groups yielded similar estimates of the returns to education and trends in these returns 
to Duraisamy.
26 The differences in Duraisamy’s estimates and those from this study 
seem to arise from differences with respect to selection, industry affiliation and the 
sample  size.  Re-estimating  the  wage  equations  without  controls  for  selection  and 
industry affiliation yields returns to education for regular workers that are about one 
to three percentage points higher than those reported in Table 5 (see Table 6). Though 
Duraisamy does control for selection in 1993-94 it is modelled as a binary outcome 
between  wage  and  non-wage  employment  and  the  estimated  returns  are  almost 
identical to those estimated without these controls. This suggests that it is important to 
consider  regular  and  casual  workers  as  competing  in  separate  labour  markets  and 
control for selection correspondingly. The main reason for the differences, however, 
seems to be the sample size – this study considers only male workers aged between 15 
and 65 years while Duraisamy’s estimates seem to be for the entire sample of male 
workers reported in the employment surveys.  
 
Estimates of returns to education are often used to inform education policy decisions 
on the allocation of public investment on different levels of education. The finding of 
relatively  low  returns  to  lower  levels  of  education  does  not,  however,  necessarily 
imply  that  educational  policy  in  India  should  not  emphasise  primary  and  middle 
schooling. First, these estimates pertain to adult male workers comprising about 41% 
of the total labour force and cannot be generalised to the entire population of female 
wage  workers  and  self-employed  individuals  (Duraisamy,  2002).  Even  within  the 
sample  of  wage  workers  though  regular  workers  have  relatively  low  returns  to 
primary education, casual workers reap some benefit from primary education but none 
                                                 
26 The education effects are marginally higher due to the exclusion of a technical education dummy due 
to data errors - all values for this variable equalled one in the 1983 survey.    27
at all from higher education levels. Second, the estimates reported in this paper are 
private  rates  of  returns  that  overlook  the  social  benefits  of  primary  education, 
especially  for  female  workers,  such  as  political  awareness  and  health  outcomes 
(Kingdon, 1998). A vitally important indirect benefit of primary education is its role 
as an input for further education. As a result investment at this levels could influence 
the rates of return at higher levels. Appleton, Hoddinott & Knight (1996) find that in 
Cote d’Ivoire and Uganda though the direct private returns to primary education are 
low  the  value  of  primary  education  as  an  input  to  post-primary  education  was 
quantitatively important. Third, using rate of return calculations to direct investment 
in education implicitly assumes that there are capacity constraints at each level of 
schooling and that, given the existing returns to education, the role of investment is to 
choose which schools (primary, middle, secondary or graduate) to build to meet the 
excess  demand.  In  countries  where  poor  school  quality  rather  than  capacity 
constraints on education are the main problem  rates of  return to higher education 
levels are less relevant (Glewwe, 1996). In this context the “deepening” of schooling 
by  increasing  quality  rather  than  “broadening”  by  increasing  quantity  is  a  more 
appropriate  strategy  (Behrman  and  Birdsall,  1993).  There  was  a  rapid  increase  in 
schooling infrastructure in India after the 1950s - the gross enrolment ratio for boys in 
primary school rose from 61% to 104% between 1950-51 and 1999-2000 and for 
middle  school  from  21%  to  67%  (Government  of  India,  2002).  There  is  some 
evidence that this led to a decline in quality (Duraisamy, 2002). In summary, these 
estimates of rates of return should be interpreted carefully as private rates of return for 
a  sample  of  adult  male  wage  workers.  Primary  and  middle  education  serve  as 
necessary inputs to higher levels of education and as such it is necessary to understand 
the reasons for low returns rather than simply directing public investment according to 
the highest rates of return (Glewwe, 1996).  
 
While  the  average  private  rate  of  return  to  primary  and  secondary  education  for 
regular workers fell immediately following the trade reforms in 1991 (the t-statistics 
for the change between 1983 and 1993 are –1.88 and –3.43 respectively), the returns 
to graduate education rose during the 1990s (the t-statistic for the change between 
1993 and 1999 is 2.34). For casual workers, on the other hand, the returns to primary 
education more than doubled (though still below one percent) between 1983 and 1999   28
(t-statistic 1.74).
27 As the supply of regular workers educated up to the secondary or 
graduate school increased throughout this period the increase in the return to graduate 
education during the 1990s suggests a corresponding rise in the relative demand for 
these  skilled  workers.  Several  other  studies  have  found  evidence  of  increasing 
educational returns for the more educated during periods of rapid economic change. 
For instance, Foster & Rosenzweig (1996) found that during the Green Revolution in 
India,  a  period  of  rapid  technical  change  in  agricultural  production,  increasing 
educational returns were concentrated among the more educated. Newell & Reilly 
(1999) also find in their study on transitional economies during the 1990s that the 
private rates of return to education rose after a period of labour market reforms. 
 
These trends are contrary to the predictions of Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory for an 
unskilled labour abundant country (though in common with several other studies in 
developing countries (see Wood (1997)). Possible explanations for this are the Skill-
Enhancing-Trade or “SET” hypothesis (Robbins, 1996) and/or a structure of trade 
protection  that  formerly  favoured  relatively  unskilled-labour  intensive  sectors 
(Harrison  and  Hanson,  1999).  Alternative  explanations  for  this  trend  include 
exogenous skilled labour intensive technological change (Lawrence and Slaughter, 
1993). The rising gap between graduate and primary education during the 1990s is 
reflected in the sharp rise in wage inequality during this period – the Gini coefficient 
of real hourly wages rose from 0.39 to 0.43 between 1983 and 1999. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This paper examines the wage determination process for different types of adult male 
workers  –  those  with  regular  wage  or  salaried  jobs  and  those  with  casual  or 
contractual jobs – based on the notion of a dual labour market. The analysis uses 
microeconomic data for three years - 1983, 1993 and 1999 - that span a period of 
rapid economic liberalisation in India.  
 
                                                 
27 A Wald test of shifts in the education coefficients from the wage equations between 1983 and either 
of the later two years (though not for the 1990s) is decisively rejected for regular workers. For casual 
workers, on the hand, the null hypothesis of no change during any pair of years cannot be rejected.   29
This  paper  finds  that  there  is  a  substantial  wage  gap  between  regular  and  casual 
workers  that  has  fallen  during  the  1990s  (after  controlling  for  various  individual 
characteristics). The main finding of this paper is that the returns to education and 
experience are significantly different for regular and casual workers consistent with 
the notion of dual primary and secondary labour markets. Casual workers face at best 
flat returns to education while the returns to education for regular workers are positive 
and rising in education level. This pattern of returns increasing in education level has 
been  observed  in  several  country  studies  in  Africa  and  Asia  (see  Bennell  (1995; 
1996a)) and in national and regional studies within India (Duraisamy, 2002; Kingdon, 
1998). There is some evidence of significant changes in the returns to education for 
regular workers over time and the widening of the gap between graduate and primary 
education could possibly be a consequence of trade liberalisation and other economic 
reforms during the 1990s.  
 
The finding of relatively low returns to lower levels of education does not necessarily 
advocate  reallocation  of  public  resources  from  primary  to  higher  education.  The 
estimates in this paper do not take into account the social costs and benefits of each 
education level. Primary and middle education serve as necessary inputs to higher 
levels  of  education  and  as  such  it  is  necessary  to  understand  the  reasons  for  low 
returns rather than simply directing public investment according to the highest rates of 
return. Given that this study does not control for natural ability or quality of schooling 
due to lack of data this pattern might imply that more able individuals obtain more 
schooling or that schooling quality improves with education level. In addition, while 
these  estimates  can  be  generalised  for  the  population  of  male  wage  workers  they 
cannot  be  generalised  to  the  entire  population  of  self-employed  individuals  and 
female wage workers. Casual workers do derive some economic returns to primary 
education but none at all from higher education levels.  
 
From a national perspective education enriches the stock of human capital that serves 
as  a  production  factor  while  from  an  individual’s  perspective  acquiring  education 
yields economic benefits in the form of higher wages. As a result education outcomes 
are inter-linked with economic growth and inequality. There is some evidence that the 
expansion of primary education resulted in higher growth in India between 1966 and 
1996  while  the  causal  relationship  between  secondary  and  higher  enrolments  and   30
growth is weak (Self and Grabowski, 2004). The pattern of returns rising with the 
education level could exacerbate wage and income inequality. A decomposition of the 
contribution  of  the  explanatory  variables  included  in  the  wage  regression  model 
estimated here following Fields (2002) revealed that about 40% of wage inequality in 
all three  years was explained by the level of education variables.  In addition, the 
rising  returns  to  graduate  education  contributed  to  the  rise  in  wage  inequality 
witnessed during the 1990s. The high private returns to higher education indicate that 
there  is  room  for  the  government  to  shift  some  of  the  costs  of  acquiring  higher 
education  to  individuals.  At  present  about  half  the  total  public  expenditure  on 
education goes to elementary education (comprising primary and middle schooling) 
and government policy lays great stress on achieving elementary education for all 
(Shariff  and  Ghosh,  2000)  -  the  Education  Bill,  2003,  sought  to  make  primary 
education free and compulsory for all. However the emphasis remains on quantity (as 
witnessed by the gross enrolment rates that exceed a hundred percent) rather than 
quality. As a result, given the low quality of schooling especially in government-
funded schools (Kingdon, 1996), public investment to raise the returns to primary 
education through investment to improve the quality of primary schooling would be 
desirable.   
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DATA APPENDIX 
The three large-scale employment surveys for January-December 1983, July 1993–June 1994 and July 
1999–June 2000 (referred to as 1983, 1993 and 1999 in the paper) provide comprehensive national 
coverage and provide a wealth of information on numerous socio-economic issues at the household and 
individual  level.  The  survey  period  is  split  into  four  sub-periods  of  three  months  duration  each, 
corresponding approximately to the four climatic seasons in 1993-94 and 1999-2000  and with the four 
agricultural seasons in 1983 (National Sample Survey Organisation, 2001). These surveys cover all 
workers  but  do  not  have  information  on  whether  the  worker  is  employed  in  the  organised  or 
unorganised sector (except for the last year).  
 
Wages 
Nominal weekly wages include payment in cash and kind. Some observations (about 1-2% in the three 
years) had to be dropped from the sample as there were missing observations on wages, hours worked 
and  industry  affiliation.  It  is  assumed  that  the  excluded  observations  are  random  as  the  mean 
observable characteristics of the workers excluded do not differ significantly from those retained in the 
sample  though  this  does  not  take  possible  differences  in  unobservables  into  account.  The  wage 
distribution  was  then  trimmed  by  0.1%  at  the  top  and  bottom  tails.  This  is  necessarily  an  ad  hoc 
measure: some researchers prefer to trim the wage distribution using specific values (Krueger and 
Summers,  1988)  while  others  prefer  to  trim  the  distribution  at  the  tails  (Arbache  et  al.,  2004)  as 
adopted here. These nominal  wages  were deflated to 1983 prices using official state-level  monthly 
consumer price indices (base year 1960-61) for agricultural labourers (CPIAL) for rural wages and 
industrial workers (CPIIW) for urban wages (Labour Bureau, various years).
28 Using the survey data on 
the intensity of work – i.e., no work, part-time or full-time – for each day of the week and assuming a 




                                                 
28 Deaton & Tarozzi (1999) and Özler, Datt & Ravallion (1996) criticise these indices as the weighting diagrams 
have remained unchanged for many years and these indices do not take into account state-level rural-urban cost of 
living differentials. However, alternate indices cannot be used as Deaton & Tarozzi (1999) do not compute price 
indices from the NSS survey data for 1983 while Özler et al. (1996) do not publish corrected official indices for 
1999.    34
Variables influencing wages 
Individuals were divided into three mutually exclusive categories using current weekly status: (i) non-
wage earners, i.e., non-participants in the labour market, self-employed and unemployed individuals (ii) 
regular wage employment and (iii) casual wage employment. The standard quadratic form for age is not 
used as this did not fit the data well and following Murphy & Welch (1990) age splines at ten-year 
intervals were included instead as a proxy for labour force experience. Marital status is a dummy 
variable coded one if currently married and zero if never married, widowed, divorced or separated. 
There is information on the highest level of schooling completed (but not on the number of years of 
schooling) so dummy variables corresponding to the following education variables were constructed: 
primary school, middle school, secondary school and graduate and above. The reference category is 
individuals who are illiterate or have less than two years of formal or informal schooling. Dummy 
variables for caste and religious affiliation were constructed from household data; the omitted category 
is all other households. Seasonality effects are captured by dummy variables for the quarter in which 
the  households  were  interviewed.  These  quarterly  dummies  were  also  interacted  with  the  dummy 
variable  for  the  rural  sector.  The  variable  for  industry  affiliation  was  constructed  based  on  the 
individual’s current weekly industrial classification. In order to ensure adequate observations in each 




Table A1: Summary statistics of the variables used in the wage regression models  
   Regular workers   Casual workers 
   1983  1993  1999  1983  1993  1999 
Natural log of real hourly wages (Rs.)  1.2679  1.5173  1.6919  0.6936  0.8513  0.9632 
  (0.5176)  (0.5867)  (0.6539)  (0.2620)  (0.2786)  (0.2910) 
Age  34.8790  36.7696  37.1110  32.4766  33.0999  33.0796 
  (11.0472)  (10.8995)  (11.2464)  (12.2919)  (12.1414)  (11.9523) 
Age spline: 15-25 years  24.1235  24.3587  24.3413  23.3198  23.5189  23.5630 
  (2.1711)  (1.8793)  (1.8730)  (2.9473)  (2.8005)  (2.7283) 
Age spline: 25-35 years  6.2395  6.9669  6.9569  5.1112  5.3953  5.4257 
  (4.2634)  (4.0333)  (4.0819)  (4.5413)  (4.4880)  (4.4887) 
Age spline: 35-45 years  3.2483  3.9034  4.0739  2.6734  2.7623  2.7481 
  (4.2377)  (4.3920)  (4.4414)  (4.0875)  (4.1097)  (4.0790) 
Age spline: 45-55 years  1.1109  1.4049  1.5646  1.1031  1.1495  1.0790 
  (2.7388)  (2.9901)  (3.1579)  (2.8418)  (2.8970)  (2.8054) 
Age spline: 55-65 years  0.1570  0.1357  0.1742  0.2690  0.2739  0.2639 
  (0.9775)  (0.8399)  (0.9289)  (1.3331)  (1.3273)  (1.3383)   35
Married  0.7760  0.8030  0.7889  0.7186  0.7334  0.7218 
  (0.4170)  (0.3978)  (0.4081)  (0.4497)  (0.4422)  (0.4481) 
Literate ‡  0.0987  0.0823  0.0715  0.1514  0.1670  0.1557 
  (0.2982)  (0.2748)  (0.2577)  (0.3584)  (0.3730)  (0.3626) 
Completed primary school  0.1472  0.1027  0.0969  0.1437  0.1447  0.1465 
  (0.3543)  (0.3035)  (0.2958)  (0.3508)  (0.3518)  (0.3536) 
Completed middle school  0.1745  0.1612  0.1694  0.0744  0.1127  0.1542 
  (0.3795)  (0.3677)  (0.3752)  (0.2624)  (0.3162)  (0.3612) 
Completed secondary school  0.2560  0.3106  0.3300  0.0207  0.0458  0.0740 
  (0.4364)  (0.4627)  (0.4702)  (0.1422)  (0.2091)  (0.2617) 
Completed graduate school  0.1403  0.2342  0.2408  0.0016  0.0036  0.0054 
  (0.3473)  (0.4235)  (0.4276)  (0.0399)  (0.0596)  (0.0733) 
Member of scheduled caste or tribe  0.1770  0.1555  0.1793  0.4092  0.4253  0.4310 
  (0.3816)  (0.3624)  (0.3836)  (0.4917)  (0.4944)  (0.4952) 
Muslim  0.0937  0.0888  0.1024  0.1143  0.1088  0.1221 
  (0.2914)  (0.2845)  (0.3032)  (0.3182)  (0.3113)  (0.3274) 
All others ‡  0.7293  0.7556  0.7183  0.4765  0.4659  0.4470 
  (0.4443)  (0.4297)  (0.4498)  (0.4995)  (0.4988)  (0.4972) 
Household interviewed in 1st quarter ‡  0.2648  0.2543  0.2528  0.2554  0.2543  0.2609 
  (0.4412)  (0.4355)  (0.4346)  (0.4361)  (0.4355)  (0.4391) 
Household interviewed in 2nd quarter  0.2519  0.2486  0.2519  0.2447  0.2556  0.2564 
  (0.4341)  (0.4322)  (0.4341)  (0.4299)  (0.4362)  (0.4366) 
Household interviewed in 3rd quarter  0.2384  0.2459  0.2464  0.2384  0.2444  0.2307 
  (0.4261)  (0.4306)  (0.4309)  (0.4261)  (0.4297)  (0.4213) 
Household interviewed in 4th quarter  0.2449  0.2512  0.2489  0.2615  0.2457  0.2520 
  (0.4300)  (0.4337)  (0.4324)  (0.4394)  (0.4305)  (0.4342) 
Rural * 1st quarter ‡  0.0820  0.0722  0.0758  0.2030  0.1966  0.1946 
  (0.2744)  (0.2588)  (0.2647)  (0.4022)  (0.3974)  (0.3959) 
Rural * 2nd quarter  0.0775  0.0718  0.0707  0.1955  0.1987  0.1939 
  (0.2674)  (0.2581)  (0.2563)  (0.3966)  (0.3990)  (0.3954) 
Rural * 3rd quarter  0.0725  0.0714  0.0683  0.1893  0.1796  0.1723 
  (0.2593)  (0.2574)  (0.2522)  (0.3917)  (0.3839)  (0.3777) 
Rural * 4th quarter  0.0778  0.0696  0.0701  0.2081  0.1890  0.1892 
  (0.2679)  (0.2545)  (0.2554)  (0.4059)  (0.3915)  (0.3917) 
Residence in rural areas  0.3098  0.2850  0.2849  0.7958  0.7640  0.7500 
  (0.4624)  (0.4514)  (0.4514)  (0.4031)  (0.4247)  (0.4330) 
Selection bias correction term  1.1441  1.1121  1.1626  1.1901  1.1453  1.1460 
  (0.5268)  (0.5122)  (0.4830)  (0.3908)  (0.4301)  (0.4113) 
Total number of observations         27,356        26,387        27,295        28,855        26,398        29,805 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations. In the case of dummy variables the mean refers 
to the percentage of observations falling in each category. 16 State and 37 industry dummy variables 




Table A2: Wage regression models: State and industry effects 
   Regular wage workers  Casual wage workers 
   1983  1993  1999  1983  1993  1999 
State of residence:             
Andhra Pradesh  -0.0907*** -0.1367*** -0.2436*** -0.0433*** -0.0885*** -0.0671*** 
  (0.0106)  (0.0127)  (0.0146)  (0.0055)  (0.0065)  (0.0067)   36
Assam  0.0046  0.0289*  -0.0550*** 0.0904***  0.0136*  -0.0094 
  (0.0138)  (0.0158)  (0.0179)  (0.0103)  (0.0082)  (0.0098) 
Bihar  -0.0376*** 0.0627***  -0.0269  -0.0443*** -0.1045*** -0.0701*** 
  (0.0120)  (0.0191)  (0.0176)  (0.0054)  (0.0068)  (0.0060) 
Gujarat  0.0273**  -0.0086  -0.0791*** 0.0331***  -0.0689*** -0.0534*** 
  (0.0113)  (0.0132)  (0.0148)  (0.0079)  (0.0084)  (0.0086) 
Haryana  0.0847***  -0.0475**  0.0617***  0.1928***  0.0691***  0.1478*** 
  (0.0170)  (0.0212)  (0.0224)  (0.0150)  (0.0218)  (0.0141) 
Himachal Pradesh  0.1569***  0.0300  -0.0039  0.0655***  -0.0270*  0.0795*** 
  (0.0200)  (0.0204)  (0.0183)  (0.0135)  (0.0140)  (0.0130) 
Karnataka  -0.0329**  -0.0491*** -0.1556*** -0.0867*** -0.0792*** -0.0701*** 
  (0.0131)  (0.0147)  (0.0154)  (0.0062)  (0.0076)  (0.0077) 
Kerala  0.0388***  -0.0318*  -0.0516*** 0.2870***  0.2691***  0.3040*** 
  (0.0138)  (0.0175)  (0.0175)  (0.0092)  (0.0121)  (0.0108) 
Madhya Pradesh  -0.1309*** -0.1530*** -0.2685*** -0.1403*** -0.1563*** -0.2360*** 
  (0.0101)  (0.0134)  (0.0148)  (0.0065)  (0.0070)  (0.0065) 
Maharashtra  0.0386***  0.0250**  -0.0543*** -0.0659*** -0.0864*** -0.1167*** 
  (0.0096)  (0.0108)  (0.0133)  (0.0056)  (0.0073)  (0.0066) 
Orissa  -0.0420*** 0.1662***  0.1019***  -0.0734*** -0.0651*** -0.1157*** 
  (0.0139)  (0.0173)  (0.0208)  (0.0063)  (0.0082)  (0.0072) 
Punjab  0.0834***  0.0476***  -0.0106  0.2831***  0.3049***  0.1897*** 
  (0.0118)  (0.0141)  (0.0155)  (0.0101)  (0.0092)  (0.0091) 
Rajasthan  -0.0107  -0.0190  -0.0728*** 0.0359***  -0.0701*** 0.0045 
  (0.0128)  (0.0167)  (0.0154)  (0.0116)  (0.0117)  (0.0108) 
Tamil Nadu  -0.1093*** -0.0347*** -0.0886*** -0.0371*** 0.0675***  0.1211*** 
  (0.0106)  (0.0122)  (0.0143)  (0.0062)  (0.0082)  (0.0078) 
Tripura  0.0459*  -0.0662*** -0.1165*** 0.1400***  0.0295**  -0.0104 
  (0.0247)  (0.0224)  (0.0215)  (0.0114)  (0.0126)  (0.0120) 
Uttar Pradesh  -0.0897*** -0.0228  -0.1609*** -0.0433*** -0.0662*** -0.1009*** 
  (0.0110)  (0.0145)  (0.0137)  (0.0074)  (0.0078)  (0.0080) 
Industry affiliation:             
Agricultural and allied activities:             
Cash crops  -0.0277  -0.0810  -0.1165*  0.0185*  -0.0132  0.0334*** 
  (0.0327)  (0.0544)  (0.0681)  (0.0097)  (0.0095)  (0.0083) 
Plantation crops  0.0200  -0.0986*** -0.2959*** 0.0664***  -0.0038  -0.0144 
  (0.0134)  (0.0246)  (0.0249)  (0.0087)  (0.0096)  (0.0122) 
Other crops  0.1417**  0.1261*  -0.0723  0.0539***  0.0223*  0.0397*** 
  (0.0697)  (0.0691)  (0.0672)  (0.0110)  (0.0123)  (0.0115) 
Animal husbandry  -0.0606*** 0.0229  -0.0659  -0.0884*** -0.0960*** -0.0964*** 
  (0.0223)  (0.0399)  (0.0474)  (0.0163)  (0.0262)  (0.0278) 
Forestry and fishing  0.1021**  0.2334***  0.2740***  0.1192***  0.1460***  0.0861*** 
  (0.0420)  (0.0432)  (0.0451)  (0.0136)  (0.0177)  (0.0174) 
Mining industries:             
Fuels  0.5758***  0.5505***  0.5751***  0.1843***  0.1457***  0.3509*** 
  (0.0179)  (0.0257)  (0.0236)  (0.0355)  (0.0523)  (0.0817) 
Minerals  0.3297***  0.2760***  0.1328**  0.1359***  0.1167***  0.1479*** 
  (0.0307)  (0.0411)  (0.0533)  (0.0147)  (0.0105)  (0.0122) 
Manufacturing industries:             
Sugar products  0.3069***  0.2728***  0.1148***  0.1096***  0.1743***  0.1894*** 
  (0.0352)  (0.0374)  (0.0411)  (0.0289)  (0.0329)  (0.0339) 
Edible oils  0.0811**  0.0786*  -0.0337  0.0434  0.0960**  0.1248*** 
  (0.0382)  (0.0437)  (0.0678)  (0.0473)  (0.0458)  (0.0477) 
Misc. food products  0.1245***  0.1162***  0.0825***  0.0904***  0.0327*  0.0672*** 
  (0.0206)  (0.0253)  (0.0287)  (0.0205)  (0.0187)  (0.0229)   37
Beverages and tobacco  0.0257  -0.0194  0.0979**  -0.0785*** -0.1362*** -0.1657*** 
  (0.0215)  (0.0403)  (0.0468)  (0.0107)  (0.0177)  (0.0315) 
Cotton textiles  0.2503***  0.1102***  0.0472*  0.1345***  0.0888***  0.0878*** 
  (0.0142)  (0.0206)  (0.0263)  (0.0130)  (0.0217)  (0.0203) 
Woollen and silk textiles  0.2099***  0.2584***  0.0680*  0.0715**  0.0615*  0.1013*** 
  (0.0235)  (0.0248)  (0.0375)  (0.0315)  (0.0359)  (0.0248) 
Jute textiles  0.3046***  0.3197***  0.0853**  0.3700***  0.1843***  0.3351*** 
  (0.0215)  (0.0231)  (0.0404)  (0.0441)  (0.0426)  (0.0852) 
Misc. textile products  0.1706***  0.1234***  0.0581**  0.0253  0.0897***  0.0331* 
  (0.0187)  (0.0240)  (0.0242)  (0.0167)  (0.0193)  (0.0193) 
Wood products incl. furniture  0.1423***  0.1645***  0.0073  0.1624***  0.1821***  0.1626*** 
  (0.0233)  (0.0354)  (0.0418)  (0.0163)  (0.0167)  (0.0164) 
Paper products, printing and publishing  0.1590***  0.1484***  0.0054  0.1292***  0.0715  0.1065*** 
  (0.0217)  (0.0279)  (0.0219)  (0.0369)  (0.0602)  (0.0214) 
Leather and leather products  0.2211***  0.1804***  0.0716**  0.1375***  0.0433  0.1290*** 
  (0.0407)  (0.0332)  (0.0351)  (0.0517)  (0.0316)  (0.0283) 
Rubber, plastic and petroleum products  0.2793***  0.2744***  0.1876***  0.0368  0.0388  0.0562* 
  (0.0352)  (0.0329)  (0.0318)  (0.0370)  (0.0421)  (0.0288) 
Misc. chemicals  0.3407***  0.3304***  0.1993***  0.0975**  0.0355  0.0729** 
  (0.0215)  (0.0244)  (0.0267)  (0.0386)  (0.0298)  (0.0355) 
Non-metallic mineral products  0.1936***  0.2765***  0.1169***  0.1132***  0.1187***  0.1320*** 
  (0.0201)  (0.0298)  (0.0312)  (0.0115)  (0.0123)  (0.0110) 
Basic metal industry  0.3897***  0.3681***  0.3441***  0.0829***  0.1097***  0.1343*** 
  (0.0179)  (0.0241)  (0.0289)  (0.0218)  (0.0239)  (0.0294) 
Metal products  0.1795***  0.1134***  0.0355  0.1131***  0.1830***  0.1037*** 
  (0.0245)  (0.0262)  (0.0252)  (0.0207)  (0.0268)  (0.0202) 
Industrial machinery  0.3460***  0.3264***  0.2463***  0.0788**  0.0679**  0.0847** 
  (0.0191)  (0.0240)  (0.0252)  (0.0342)  (0.0328)  (0.0359) 
Electrical appliances and electronics  0.2873***  0.2889***  0.1138***  0.0441  0.0640**  -0.0736* 
  (0.0297)  (0.0332)  (0.0325)  (0.0466)  (0.0314)  (0.0379) 
Sea, rail and motor transport equipment  0.2899***  0.2869***  0.0597**  -0.0543**  -0.0609*  -0.0743*** 
  (0.0204)  (0.0266)  (0.0269)  (0.0275)  (0.0340)  (0.0252) 
Other transport equipment  0.0639*  0.1660***  -0.0396  -0.1087*** -0.0616  -0.1263*** 
  (0.0335)  (0.0440)  (0.0423)  (0.0407)  (0.0480)  (0.0399) 
Misc. manufacturing industry  0.1824***  0.2423***  0.0882***  0.0925***  0.1992***  0.1842*** 
  (0.0238)  (0.0238)  (0.0275)  (0.0257)  (0.0218)  (0.0233) 
Utilities  0.3817***  0.4443***  0.5378***  0.1526***  0.2070***  0.0943* 
  (0.0165)  (0.0215)  (0.0250)  (0.0240)  (0.0406)  (0.0511) 
Construction  0.2360***  0.2229***  0.2005***  0.1383***  0.1731***  0.1603*** 
  (0.0177)  (0.0246)  (0.0261)  (0.0050)  (0.0051)  (0.0041) 
Trade, hotels and restaurants:             
Wholesale and retail trade  0.0085  -0.0073  -0.0149  0.0165  0.0143  0.0378*** 
  (0.0119)  (0.0166)  (0.0184)  (0.0116)  (0.0122)  (0.0101) 
Hotels and restaurants  0.0691***  0.1366***  0.0637***  0.0004  0.0501**  0.0978*** 
  (0.0174)  (0.0214)  (0.0241)  (0.0204)  (0.0215)  (0.0186) 
Transport, storage and communications:             
Railway transport services  0.3199***  0.3925***  0.4751***  0.1474***  0.1657***  0.4073*** 
  (0.0123)  (0.0187)  (0.0219)  (0.0274)  (0.0288)  (0.0879) 
Other transport services, storage and 
communications  0.2548***  0.2658***  0.1825***  0.1424***  0.1574***  0.1479*** 
  (0.0118)  (0.0169)  (0.0183)  (0.0097)  (0.0092)  (0.0093) 
Services:             
Services 1  0.2987***  0.3392***  0.3388***  0.1030**  -0.0410  0.1077* 
  (0.0105)  (0.0161)  (0.0186)  (0.0461)  (0.0564)  (0.0565)   38
Services 2  0.0344**  0.0426**  -0.0035  0.0463***  0.0519***  0.0587*** 
  (0.0137)  (0.0172)  (0.0236)  (0.0091)  (0.0102)  (0.0089) 
Public administration  0.2635***  0.3086***  0.3759***  0.0996***  0.0928***  0.0893*** 
   (0.0100)  (0.0152)  (0.0184)  (0.0176)  (0.0208)  (0.0335) 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. * significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% and *** at 




Figure A1: Kernel density plots of real weekly wages (Rs.), 1983-1999 
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Note: The y-axis plots the density of the real weekly wages. The kernel distribution plot for casual 
workers is the taller curve with very low dispersion; the kernel distribution plot for regular workers is 
the widely dispersed curve. 
 
 
 
 
 